Michigan Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 6

1941

CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION - MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY
FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN PAST
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION - MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR SERVICES
RENDERED IN PAST, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1025 (1941).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol39/iss6/16

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

1025

CONTRACTS CONSIDERATION MORAL OBLIGATION TO p AY FOR
SERVICES RENDERED IN PAST After decedent's wife died, claimants, her

mother and sister, at the request of the decedent, broke up their home and came
to live with him, to keep house for him and to care for his children. These
services continued for ten years, at which time the decedent gave claimants his
promissory notes aggregating $2,000. They entered these notes as claims against
his estate. Held, the claimants' services, even if rendered gratuitously, were
performed at the decedent's request and raised a moral obligation which was
sufficient consideration for the notes. In re Schoenkerma-1?s Estate, (Wis. I 940)
294 N. W. 810.
Wisconsin is one of the states following the "more liberal view" of the
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doctrine of moral consideration.1 Under this view, a promise to pay for past
services rendered by the promisee to the promisor at the latter's request is
enforceable even though there was never a pre-existing legal obligation to pay
for the services.2 The merits of the view have been debated,8 but there appears
to be a tendency toward its wider acceptance.4 The court in the principal case,
however, holds that the promise is enforceable even though the services were
presumably performed by the promisees without any intention of receiving compensation therefor. 5 In so holding it goes a step beyond the usual rule,6 as well
as beyond the implications of its own earlier decisions. 7 The court cites no
authority for abandoning the proposition .that the promisee's expectation of payment is essential to a finding of good consideration, and the great weight of
authority is contrary to this holding. 8 But the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 9
1

Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516 (1932);
Estate of Smith, 226 Wis. 556, 277 N. W. 141 (1938). Annotations, 17 A. L. R.
1296 at 1299 (1922); 79 A. L. R. 1339 at 1346 (1932).
2
Annotations, 17 A. L. R. 1296 at 1299 (1922); 79 A. L. R. 1339 at 1346
(1932).
3
Ferguson v. Harris, 39 S. C. 323, 17 S. E. 782 (1893); Muir v. Kane, 55
Wash. 131, 104 P. 153 (1909); 16 MrnN. L. REv. 808 (1932); 36 MicH. L. REv.
1010 (1938).
4
Annotation, 79 A. L. R. 1339 at 1346 (1932); 36 MICH. L. REv. 1010
(1938).
5
"If it be true that under the circumstances of this case the presumption arises
that the services were gratuitous, a fact we need not and therefore do not decide, it
does not follow that there must have been a legal obligation to compensate in order
to constitute a moral obligation a good consideration." Principal case, 294 N. W. at 8II.
When services are rendered by a member of the family, a relative, or the like,
they are usually presumed to be gratuitous. Cox v. Davis, 8 5 W. Va. 604, 102 S. E.
236 (1920); Shugart v. Shugart, III Tenn. 179, 76 S. W. 821 (1903). See annotation, Ann. Cas. 1913A 861 at 865 (1913); 16 MINN. L. REv. 808 at 815
(1932).
6
Lanfier v. Lanfier, 227 Iowa 258, 288 N. W. 104 (1939); Irons Investment Co.
v. Richardson, 184 Wash. II8, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935); annotations cited in note 2,
supra; 5 CoRN. L. Q. 450 (1920); 31 ILL. L. REv. 390 (1936); 36 M1cH. L. REV.
1010 (1938); 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 146 (1936) (but see cases
cited by Williston in note 4).
7 "We believe that in none of the c;ases stating the rule so narrowly [requiring a
prior legal obligation] did the promiser originally receive from the promisee a thing
of value for which the promisee expected payment- and was given to understand he
would be paid••••" Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516
(1932).
8 Annotations cited in note 2, supra; 29 YALE L. J. 800 ( I 920) ; ANSON, CoNTRACTs, 5th Am. ed. (Corbin), §§ 146, _147 (1930); I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev.
ed., § 146 (1936).
9
In re Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 50 A. 943 (1902), in which the notes
involved were accepted in lieu of inheritance which promisees expected to receive.
The following cases also have been cited for the proposition, but do not appear to
decide it squarely: Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864); Brickell v. Hendricks,
121 Miss. 356, 83 So. 609 (1919); Olsen v. Hagan, 102 Wash. 321, 172 P. I 173
(1918). The last case is distinguished in Irons Investment Co. v. Richardson, 184
Wash. u8, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935).
.
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and a few intermediate courts 10 are in accord with the principal case. Granting
the validity of the "liberal view," this extension of it is not without merit. It
has been said that this interpretation would raise a moral obligation to pay for
every gratuity,11 but the requirement that the promisor must have requested the
services 12 should be a safeguard against any such unfortunate result. The extent
to which the courts will go in making exceptions to the doctrine of consideration
should be determined by considerations of policy and convenience in administration. The element of expectation of payment often is difficult to determine and
generally is controlled by presumptions and rules to fit specific types of fact
situations,1 3 in which the moral obligation often is peculiarly strong. The rule
in the principal case, on the other hand, should be easy to administer. As a further element, the obligation may be said to be strengthened by the promisor's
recognition of it in making the promise, especially if it is in the form of a
promissory note.14 Although this reasoning can be called circular, it appears to
have influenced the court in the principal case to some degree.15 Since moral
obligations stem from what the court thinks the promisor's ethical sensibilities
should be, they should not be controlled by the intention or understanding of
the promisee. The principal case recognizes this principle and considers the
situation from the viewpoint of the promisor. This approach enables the court
to base its conclusion on an objective analysis and is therefore to be commended.

10 Wood v. Flanery, 89 Mo. App. 632 (1901); and a line of New York cases,
including Oatfield v. Waring, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 188 (1817); Yarwood v. Trusts &
Guarantee Co., 94 App. Div. 47, 87 N. Y. S. 947 (1904); Matter of Simmons' Estate,
48 Misc. 484, 96 N. Y. S. 1103 (1905). But see Strevell v. Jones' Estate, 106 App.
Div. 334, 94 N. Y. S. 627 (1905); Matter of Van Vranken's Estate, 120 Misc.
280, 198 N. Y. S. 445 (1923).
11 Irons Investment Co. v. Richardson, 184 Wash. 118, 50 P. (2d) 42 (1935);
ANSON, CoNTRACTS, 5th Am. ed. (Corbin), § 127 (1930).
12 In Holland v. Martinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 P. 902 (1925), the services were
not requested but were certainly not gratuitous. In this unusual situation the court
held that the services constituted a good consideration for a. later promise to pay for
them.
13 See annotations cited in note 2, supra; also Ann. Cas. 1913A 861 at 865
(1913).
14 Wood v. Flanery, 89 Mo. App. 632 (1901). Request inferred where services
not gratuitous, Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637 (1870); Wilson v. Edmonds, 24 N. H.
517 (1852).
15 "In the instant case the decedent was manifestly under a moral obligation to
pay the claimants. • • • In executing and delivering the notes to them he plainly
recognized that obligation and from any point of view it afforded more than ample
consideration for the notes." Principal case, 294 N. W. at 811-812. However, the
amount of the notes, $2,000, is so grossly inadequate as compensation for the services,
ten years of household work, that the decedent's intention was probably more donative
than compensatory. So the quoted argument seems to have little force.

